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The focus of the twenty-second Global Game, played at the U.S. Naval WarCollege in the summer of 2000, was to explore ways to implement network-
centric operations.1 Since its inception in 1978, the annual Global Game in
Newport, Rhode Island, has been among the preeminent analytic resources of
the U.S. national security community. Throughout its history it has represented
“an opportunity to investigate ideas and concepts that may vary from current
strategy or policy wisdom.”2 From its inception, the game series has confronted
defining issues: the first five years constituted a “test bed or crucible for an
emerging maritime strategy,” a strategy that was to be the U.S. Navy’s fundamen-
tal concept of global warfare until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.3
Global 2000, conducted by some six hundred invited players and guests, plus
gaming staff, in the College’s new McCarty Little Hall from 14 to 25 August
2000, grappled with an issue—network-centric warfare—no less crucial to the
Navy’s future than was power projection in 1978–83, and it focused upon an
“emerg ing” do cument l ike ly to shap e the
twenty-first-century Navy as fundamentally as did
the Maritime Strategy the fleet of the 1980s and
nineties—the Capstone Concept for the Navy after
Next, being prepared by the Navy Warfare Develop-
ment Command, Newport, Rhode Island. This arti-
cle will examine the observations that emerged from
that exercise, the directions further research should
take to assess those observations, and some more
general issues that arose concerning the gaming of
futuristic operational concepts and combat systems.
Dr. Watman is the chairman of the War Gaming Depart-
ment of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval
Warfare Studies. He received his doctorate in 1997 from
Ohio State University, having earned a J.D. degree from
Case Western Reserve and master’s degrees from both
Ohio State University and the Naval War College. He has
served in the RAND Corporation, the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, and the U.S. intelligence community. He
is the coauthor of several RAND books, most recently U.S.
Nuclear Declaratory Policy: The Question of Nuclear
First Use and U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, and
is the author of several articles.
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CONCEPTS AND PURPOSES
“Network-centric operations” are military activities undertaken by forces that
are thoroughly interconnected, or netted. Such interconnection permits com-
plete and rapid sharing of information, plans, and assessments. Given a fully
functioning network, what one part of the force “knows” about the adversary or
battlespace, the entire force knows; what one part “sees,” all parts see; and what
one part “thinks” is available to the whole force. This is not simply a matter of ef-
ficiency and convenience: the anticipated payoffs include greatly accelerated and
rapidly adaptable military operations, indeed to such an extent as to render an
adversary effectively paralyzed, “locked out” of the battle. Today, however,
theater-level analysis of network-centric operations is at a rudimentary stage.
Much has been written characterizing these operations, in a variety of aspects,
but relatively little empirical data has been produced with which to test these
predictions.
Global 2000 was intended to help meet that need. For this purpose it was
necessary to permit as full an exploration of network-centric operations as
possible. Therefore, the game design deliberately excluded almost entirely the
political constraints that in the “real world” would almost certainly not allow
network-centric operations to take their own course unchecked. This lack of
constraint is clearly unrealistic, but it was a necessary “laboratory condition” if
the game was to help players and analysts understand the full array of phenom-
ena associated with network-centric operations. For example, the game-control
cell permitted network-centric operations to set their own pace—which was as
rapid as possible—even though in a more realistic framework a “national com-
mand authority” cell would have slowed the pace of events. Further, in Global
2000 the National Command Authority permitted BLUE—in effect, the United
States and its allies—to strike a broader range of targets than likely would have
been authorized. Most important, the game controllers permitted BLUE to be-
have much more aggressively than would have been the case in the “real world.”
These features of Global 2000 were deliberate and necessary artificialities, and
they in no way reflect current U.S. policy or expectations of future intentions.
Global 2000 sought to address (but surely not completely) two primary ques-
tions. Will network-centric military operations in fact speed military opera-
tions, as predicted? If so, how will commanders and their staffs manage this
increased tempo, and how will they employ the information network connect-
ing the force elements?
The game also explored the “pillars,” or “subconcepts,” of network-centric
operations, as described in the draft Capstone Concept: information/knowl-
edge advantage, assured access, effects-based operations, and sea basing. In-
formation/knowledge advantage is a prerequisite for effective network-centric
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operations—achieving, defending, and using a superior capability to collect in-
formation and draw operational inferences from it. This advantage lies at the
heart of the benefits expected from network-centric operations; for this reason,
adversaries can be expected to attack it and to defend their own information.
That raised a further question to be explored by Global 2000: Will the value of
information produce a “fight for information” in future military campaigns,
and if so, what can be said about the conduct of that fight?
Assured access refers to the ability to operate in any ocean area or airspace,
when necessary, at an acceptable cost. The concept does not imply that the
U.S. Navy must be able to place high-value combat assets anywhere, at any time.
Rather, it means that the Navy
must be able to conduct its mis-
sions wherever it needs to at a given
time. The Global 2000 scenario
required BLUE to gain assured ac-
cess to a heavily contested, con-
fined body of water near an adversary; as a result, the gamers were able to
explore a further specific question: What concepts of operations and platforms
would be most useful for assured access?
Effects-based operations, of whatever size, are planned and executed so as to
produce, if indirectly, particular desirable reactions. Such enemy reactions may
range from sending forces in certain directions to shutting down segments of air
defense systems, even to suing for peace. The purpose of conceiving military op-
erations in terms of their desired effects is to deemphasize preoccupation with
massive physical destruction of the adversary. Inducing desired effects may in-
volve the integration of several tools, such as information operations, deception,
movement, and timing, in addition to attacks upon targets. Even for physical
destruction itself, effects-based planning calls for careful choices of precise
targets in order to induce particular responses. This often requires painstaking
analysis of an adversary’s values, culture, processes, and politics, so as to hit the
points, of all kinds, that will have the desired effect, and no others. The related
question explored by Global 2000 was: Will effects-based operations produce
military campaigns noticeably different from those conducted along more tra-
ditional lines? If not, does the concept contribute materially to advancing U.S.
thinking about warfighting in general, and network-centric operations in partic-
ular?
Sea basing is a concept by which military expeditions would be conducted
from the sea rather than from land bases in a theater. It recognizes that in the fu-
ture land bases may be either denied politically or vulnerable to attack, es-
pecially by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The concept argues that
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the United States must reduce its expeditionary “footprint” on land, particu-
larly that of ground forces and logistical support, by basing as many military
functions at sea as possible. Global 2000 was designed to explore sea basing in
general, and in particular a hypothetical large and very fast logistics ship known
as the “Theater Support Logistics Vessel.” The question on sea basing examined
in Global 2000 was: How and to what extent would ships with the characteristics
of the hypothetical Theater Support Logistics Vessel affect the Navy’s sea-basing
capabilities?
SCENARIO AND GAME “FLOW”
The scenario for Global 2000 placed the players in 2010. Between 2000 and 2010,
it posited, a technologically advanced adversary (RED) had become increasingly
willing to use military force to resolve its national security concerns. One such
concern was a border dispute with BROWN, an ally of BLUE. BROWN’s vigorous
economy and self-confident society made it a potential regional competitor,
from the viewpoint of RED, which had ultimately decided to head off this even-
tuality through military aggression. RED’s primary objective was to disrupt the
treaty obligations between BLUE and BROWN, eliminate the basing of BLUE forces
within BROWN’s territory, and remove BLUE’s military presence from the region.
As diplomatic relations with BROWN grew contentious, RED adopted a mili-
tary strategy that included a series of annual “active defense” training exercises,
beginning in 2007. RED intended to use these exercises to cover the logistical and
operational preparations for an attack on BROWN. A BLUE-led coalition, along
with BROWN and GREEN (a neighboring island nation), responded, beginning in
2008, by monitoring RED’s exercises. For two years, these exercises and monitor-
ing deployments were conducted without incident. In 2010, however, RED in-
tended to initiate its long-planned assault upon BROWN, under the cover of its
usual exercise. Its plan was to launch a limited but swift surprise attack with air
and ground forces. RED intended, after the speedy seizure of secure enclaves in-
side BROWN, to halt and call for negotiations leading to mutual RED and BLUE
withdrawals from BROWN and termination of BLUE-BROWN treaty arrange-
ments. RED calculated that it could deter BLUE intervention, or make it exces-
sively costly, by controlling sea and air access to BROWN and by destroying
valuable and politically salient portions of BLUE’s forces, such as capital ships.
BLUE had developed a three-phase campaign plan against such a contingency. Its
first element was Operation OVERWATCH, which would emplace (as part of a BLUE
coalition exercise) an “expeditionary sensor grid,” a sophisticated netted collection
of sensors, and then use it, when ordered, to gather targeting information on
RED invasion forces. BLUE thus placed early priority on gaining the information
advantage it would need to employ a network-centric strategy successfully. In
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OVERWATCH, BLUE planned to establish and operate a robust C4ISR* architec-
ture to help create and maintain a common operating picture of the key move-
ments of RED forces. BLUE forces could then “network” to share information and
collaborate in real time.
The second phase of the BLUE campaign plan was OVERKILL, operations
against RED offensive capabilities—even if that meant firing first. In the event of
hostilities, BLUE commanders were also, under this heading, to defend BROWN
and to take appropriate force-protection and power-projection actions.4 More-
over, BLUE would try to ensure
access to the operating area by
eliminating havens or sanctuaries
from which RED might operate.
The third element was Operation
OVERWITH—counteroffensive
operations to eject RED forces, should they invade BROWN territory; to restore
the previous border between RED and BROWN; and to reestablish freedom of
navigation in territorial waters.
When the game began, OVERWATCH had been initiated; in the course of game
play that phase was carried out successfully, in spite of early attempts by RED to
attack the expeditionary sensor grid and inhibit BLUE’s ability to profit from the
information gathered. That information pointed increasingly to the imminence
of RED offensive incursions into BROWN; in response, the BLUE National
Command Authority approved a transition to Operation OVERKILL—large-scale
operations against RED’s offensive forces and infrastructure—before RED had
attacked BROWN or even seriously contested BLUE’s presence in the area. The
BLUE political leadership based this decision on its judgment that there existed
“unambiguous warning” of RED’S intent to strike BROWN.
OVERKILL severely disrupted RED’s planned actions and greatly weakened its
assault but did not, in the event, prevent it from occupying a portion of BROWN
or from delivering serious attacks on BLUE sea and air forces. Still, BLUE losses
were not large enough to diminish significantly its ability to protect BROWN.
BLUE accordingly began Operation OVERWITH, ground operations supported
by joint and coalition air, maritime, and special operations forces. The counter-
offensive incorporated high-speed maritime logistics ships and other advanced
sea-basing concepts. Game controllers halted play when it was clear that RED’s
enclaves within BROWN were about to be eliminated.
W A T M A N 7 9
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OBSERVATIONS MERITING DEVELOPMENT
Traditionally, the Global series has served both training and research objectives.
With respect to the former, it has provided senior officers, particularly those of
the Navy, opportunities to become familiar with futuristic systems and opera-
tional concepts, as well as with likely aspects of potential political-military cri-
ses. The participants reported that Global 2000 performed this function well,
through its focus on network-centric operations and the four supporting pillars
of that concept.
We must be cautious, however, in evaluating the performance of Global 2000
as a research tool. So elaborate a war game can be held only once per year. We
must be especially careful not to generalize from a single game—the behavior of
one set of players in the context of one scenario—to broad conclusions about
the value of particular systems or concepts. War games seldom produce firm
“findings,” and that is particularly true of large, elaborate, infrequently played
games like the Global series. Instead, Global 2000 can best be viewed as a source
of observations about systems and concepts, observations that should be tested
and assessed by careful and detailed analysis.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Obtaining Information
The expeditionary sensor grid was the single most important “force multiplier”
possessed by the BLUE players. That complex system of netted sensors provided
them with plentiful, targeting-quality data about RED’s order of battle, disposi-
tions, and movements. In fact, the grid was largely responsible for the fact that
the BLUE strikes against RED’s preparations for invasion of BROWN inflicted dis-
ruption from which RED never recovered. Both RED and BLUE understood, if not
fully, the advantage conferred by the grid’s capabilities. As a result, the first salvo
of the game involved RED attacks on the grid and BLUE operations to defend it. It
can be truly said, therefore, that the first battle of the campaign was fought over
information. That battle lasted throughout the campaign, concluding only
when the game itself did.
The important issue that arises is how best to conduct this battle, and a gen-
eral observation upon it seems in order. The process by which information is
gained, used, defended, and denied has grown increasingly important and com-
plex. We can expect this trend to continue as the information-related military
capabilities of the United States grow and its operational concepts become con-
comitantly dependent on information superiority. This suggests that the fight to
obtain and protect information superiority cannot be consigned to an annex or
tab of a military campaign’s operational plan, as it so often is today. Rather, it
will have to be viewed as a distinct aspect of the campaign, needing doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures of its own. These are now very rudimentary,
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if they exist at all. The details of the “fight for information” represent an excel-
lent candidate for intensive follow-on research.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Managing Information
Information, once collected and defended, must be exploited properly if it is to
be of value. “Exploitation” is the process of assessing information and dissemi-
nating it in usable form to the entities requiring it, all within appropriate time
limits. Global 2000 experimented
with this command-and-control
process, in part by providing play-
ers with computers (linked in a
“game internet”) and software by
which information could be readily shared and moved. Players were free to post
on-line whatever they felt was useful and were similarly free to retrieve anything
that had been posted. Their actual use of this capability was interesting and re-
vealing in several ways.
First, players very quickly began using the game internet with great intensity.
Within one hour of the game’s start, the available bandwidth was being regularly
saturated, causing the technical performance of the network to deteriorate.
Analysis showed that players posted information virtually without restraint,
even large data files and graphics-rich briefings and articles. Usage rules soon
had to be imposed to prevent the system from becoming unusable. Second, the
players were unable to assess the validity of posted information. Communica-
tions, messages, and information could be edited freely, by anyone, and then
reposted; amended versions quickly proliferated. Postings intended to be
directive—as commander’s intent, rules of engagement, and even direct or-
ders—quickly became ineffectual, as players lost the ability to determine which
version was authoritative. Third, players were able to use effectively compara-
tively little of the power of the software provided to search the net, display in-
formation in revealing ways, and process data. This was particularly true of
commanders, who had difficulty moving quickly from one item of important
information about the battle to another as the campaign progressed.
Many discussions of network-centric warfare have conveyed visions of a
command-and-control structure akin to the civilian Internet. They presume
that the natural creativity, spontaneity, and adaptability of war fighters can be
unleashed by freedom from constraint analogous to that of the civilian Internet
in commercial settings. No such vision was realized in Global 2000. The difficul-
ties the players encountered may well not have been artifacts of this particular
game; it should not be surprising that the civilian model of a network may not
be transplantable directly into the military domain. The World Wide Web leaves
W A T M A N 8 1
Like other facets of network-centric command
and control, the Knowledge Wall seems to have
called for structure, constraint, and discipline.
7
Watman: Global 2000
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
it to individual users to form their own opinions as to the accuracy of informa-
tion they find there; military users have neither the time nor the resources to do
so—yet the stakes for military users are quite high. The Web contains search en-
gines; the Global game net, at least, did not. World Wide Web users often are not
under time pressure; military users generally are.
For these reasons, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that whatever form a mili-
tary operational net might take, the information it contains is likely to require
considerable structure and “predigestion.” Doctrine will also be necessary to
impose constraints on who can use the military net, where, when, and for what.
The rights to post and edit will have to be limited to prevent the loss of “config-
uration control” observed in Global 2000. In sum, Global 2000 suggests that
command and control using information networking will require a new body of
doctrine, akin to that developed for traditional command and control. If so, it
will be no trivial matter to balance the power of netted collaboration against the
need to impose more traditional discipline.
In a similar vein, the difficulties encountered by commanders in managing
and focusing the flow of information to and from themselves suggest the need
for a new staff function—the knowledge manager. In Global 2000, individuals
were placed in each game cell to help players, especially commanders, cope with
the command and control network. These individuals, all civilians, succeeded to
varying degrees; it became quite clear, however, that the knowledge-manage-
ment function was much needed. Precisely how that service should be provided
is an open question. Should the individuals be military staff officers or civilians?
Should they be primarily war fighters or technical specialists? Should they be
simply “consultants” or the commanders’ alter egos? These issues are already be-
ing grappled with today by the new and growing knowledge-management
community.
Information/Knowledge Advantage: Sharing Information
Part of the command and control capability supplied to BLUE was the “common
operating picture.” In physical terms, the common operating picture was repre-
sented in Global 2000 by a collection of video monitors, known as “the Knowl-
edge Wall,” displaying the status of different military functional areas—logistics,
theater air and missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
the like. At the center of this display were two large monitors showing the entire
theater and the locations of various BLUE and RED units. Icons on all displays
could be “clicked” upon for more detailed information. In principle, the BLUE
commander and staff members could use the Knowledge Wall simultaneously
and independently, as dictated by each individual’s needs.
8 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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In actual utility the Knowledge Wall fell short of the ideal, for reasons consis-
tent with the information-related problems already discussed. The BLUE players
did not need all the information the Wall provided, and they had difficulty
weighing its validity. The forms in
which information was conveyed
were often not transparent or in-
tuitive. The players did not have
the time, training, or patience to
sift the wealth of information on
the Knowledge Wall to find “nuggets” of value to them. Like other facets of
network-centric command and control, the Knowledge Wall seems to have
called for structure, constraint, and discipline. Again, the problem is how to pro-
vide those things without destroying the collaborative, horizontal, and largely
unimpeded transfer of information that lends such revolutionary power to
modern information technology.
Assured Access: Exploiting Information
The value of knowledge can be a function of time. Some knowledge may seem
virtually eternal—for example, philosophic truths. But information about a
military adversary has value only so long as the information is current and rele-
vant. For example, a vulnerability is not likely to exist indefinitely. The enemy
may become aware of it and correct it. Also, a vulnerability may be the transient
result of a particular sequence of events—when that sequence ends, the vulner-
ability disappears. Specifically, adversaries preparing attacks often incur the
vulnerabilities of concentration as their forces mass together; this vulnerability
is alleviated when the forces disperse, perhaps during the attack itself.
Precisely this vulnerability presented itself to BLUE as RED built up forces for
the incursion into BROWN. RED accepted this vulnerability in part because hos-
tilities had not begun; it did not believe that BLUE could detect and target the
massing forces.5 RED’s calculations proved incorrect on both counts. The expe-
ditionary sensor grid enabled BLUE to detect and target RED’s forces, to a consid-
erable extent. It allowed BLUE to perceive not only that an attack was imminent
but also that some elements of the RED force would disperse prior to the attack,
thereby becoming less vulnerable. It was for this reason that BLUE attacked when
it did, while the RED forces were still concentrated. Strictly speaking, therefore, it
is correct to say that BLUE was the first to attack massively the military capabili-
ties of its adversary—though RED was in the process of “pulling the trigger.”
The larger issue raised here is straightforward: Will U.S. forces have the free-
dom of action to exploit their information advantages? The easy answer, of
course, would be, “It depends.” Is the nation in the midst of a conflict, or does
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exploiting the information advantage entail preemption? How great are the ben-
efits of acting first? How durable are those benefits? What responses are avail-
able to the adversary? What opportunities are open to the adversary to escalate?
And, of course, what are the political implications?
Though the specifics depend on the situation, it is reasonable to suspect that
the broad pressures to act early felt by BLUE in Global 2000 were “real” and not
game artifacts. Information tends to be a wasting asset: the greater one’s infor-
mation advantages, the greater the incentive to exploit them before they dimin-
ish, then vanish. Not to act would waste the investment made to obtain the
information advantage in the first place—and that investment is likely to have
been considerable.
Yet the operating environments of U.S. military forces often include restric-
tive rules of engagement and formidable reluctance by the national command
authority to permit early or independent action, and that state of affairs is likely
to continue. Precisely that sort of tension developed in Global 2000 between the
game political leadership and the theater military commanders, even with the
artificially relaxed political constraints. The dimensions and details of this prob-
lem represent a fertile area for further research. In particular, ways of developing
more flexible rules of engagement are being actively explored and will be part of
Global 2001. The stakes are high; much of the operational advantage gained by
network-centric operations could be thrown away by strategic-level caution, de-
lay, or inaction. Yet such “friction” at the strategic level may be the unavoidable
result of coalition or alliance influence. Coalition partners frequently find the
United States too eager to act quickly and decisively, and they typically require
restraint as a condition for participation in coalition operations. In such a case
network-centric warfare could never achieve full expression. There may be no
real solution to this problem, but we must thoroughly explore it before accept-
ing that pessimistic conclusion.
Effects-Based Operations
Analysts of effects-based operations often assert that massive physical attacks
are not a particularly potent way of creating effects with respect to an adversary’s
perceptions. Whether that is true or not, effects-based operations do involve the
precise control, direction, and focus of force in time and space. Frequently the
concept is contrasted with “attrition-based warfare,” which conjures up images
of massive, indiscriminate, industrial-style onslaughts.
In Global 2000, the players were made aware at the outset that effects-based
operations constituted a focus of the game. The extent to which players actually
undertook them, however, is unclear. Certainly the language of effects-based op-
erations was spoken often by commanders and staff members; planners were
8 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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ordered to design campaigns with the aim of producing specific effects. There
was, however, no common understanding of what effects-based operations
entail and how to go about them. Some players envisioned influencing the ad-
versary’s highest leadership—a strategic-level definition; others applied it to the
RED operational commanders; some used the term to connote information op-
erations; yet others conflated the concept with “signaling,” using force for sym-
bolic and demonstrative purposes. This diversity of views was aggravated by
time pressure and the absence of straightforward ways to link BLUE options with
specific effects on RED.
In the event, though BLUE’s operations were not indiscriminate, they were
massive and directed to the physical destruction of RED; it would be difficult to
distinguish the aim points of BLUE weapons in Global 2000 from those of the
weap ons ac tua l ly launched
against Iraq a decade earlier. In
sum, simple knowledge of a con-
cept called “effects-based opera-
tions” was widely shared among
the players. Much less widely
shared was an understanding of what the concept entails. Finally, on the basis
of Global 2000, it would be hard to claim that effects-based operations look ap-
preciably different from current U.S. military practice.
The research implications of this experience may be hard to implement. First,
greater effort is required to clarify what effects-based operations are intended to
be and how they differ from past practice. Second, research is badly needed to
evaluate whether or not the theory of effects-based operations can be concretely
applied in a campaign. In other words, do effects-based operations actually exist
in a way that can be reliably operationalized? There is no doubt that some mili-
tary operations have had effects on the enemy well beyond the physical destruc-
tion inflicted—the 1942 Doolittle raid on Japan is an example; the 1968 Tet
offensive of the Vietnam War is another; so are the 1983 Beirut bombing and the
events of 1993 in Somalia. The problem facing American planners is how to con-
vert knowledge that such operations are possible into a reliable, predictable, and
controllable tool for directing U.S. military force.
Sea Basing
Global 2000 was not designed to generate information sufficiently detailed to
bear on platform design or choices among alternative platforms. That said, the
game included a notional platform, the Theater Logistics Support Vessel (TLSV).
This ship was defined only in a general way, as a large catamaran of advanced de-
sign capable of high speeds (forty to fifty knots) in the open sea and of very
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quick loading and unloading. Like the expeditionary sensor grid, the Theater
Logistics Support Vessel had a considerable effect on BLUE’s ability to respond
quickly to RED’s attack on BROWN.
Specifically, the TLSV permitted BLUE to implement what is described in
Joint Vision 2020 as “focused logistics.” Its speed and capacity allowed it to make
numerous round trips between logistical centers and deployed ground and air
forces in the same time a conventional logistics ship needs to make just one. As
a result, BLUE was relieved of the necessity to project logistics requirements far
ahead, and in turn, logistical stocks in the field could be substantially reduced
or eliminated. The players described the approach as close to a “just-in-time”
supply organization.
The speed of the TLSVs was also used to offset the problems arising when
events caught a maritime prepositioning ship out of position. The BLUE com-
mander was able to offload the prepositioning material to TLSVs, which quickly
delivered it. As a result, ground operations could begin sooner than would have
been the case had BLUE been compelled to wait until the maritime
prepositioning ship could steam to the theater.6
Finally the speed of the Theater Logistics Support Vessels provided greater
protection from submarine attack, in two ways. First, submarines had difficulty
achieving good positions for torpedo shots (though, of course, speed was no de-
fense against antiship missiles). Second, BLUE antisubmarine warfare forces
could sweep submarine-free channels more effectively, because the TLSVs could
traverse them so quickly thereafter; with slower-moving ships, submarines
might have been able to reenter the cleared lanes in time. For the same reason,
the swept zones could be narrower.
Much research remains to be done, however, before a Theater Logistics Sup-
port Vessel as hypothesized by Global 2000 can be seriously contemplated by
the Navy. Initial assessments will focus on how Navy and Marine Corps force
structure and deployments could be affected by them. If these studies and rough
order-of-magnitude costing prove encouraging, more detailed analysis could be
undertaken.
BALANCING CONSTRAINTS AND OPERATIONAL FREEDOM
To begin, we must again emphasize the limits of any single war game: these
observations arising from Global 2000 must be viewed as tentative, fragile, the
merest beginnings of further investigation. But they are nonetheless important
and interesting. They all address major dimensions of network-centric operations;
they are all plausible; and none can be easily explained away as a game artifact.
If a theme connects most of the observations, it is that modern information
technology and current concepts for its use did not free the Global 2000
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participants from the need for certain traditional constraints, at least not to the
extent envisioned in theoretical discussions of network-centric operations. If a
single challenge emerges, it is how to capture the predicted advantages of
information-rich environments while avoiding the problems observed in Global
2000. Specifically, netted command and control still seems to require a doctrine
that limits the ways the net can be used, what can be introduced into it, and
who can alter what is already circulating. Further, a common operational picture
does not in itself enable the parts of a force or staff to regulate themselves; some
shaping and filtering of the data in that common operating picture is still re-
quired. (These are substantial problems, but certain allowances must be made at
this early stage for “experimental technique.” First, the Global 2000 players may
not have fully understood how to exploit the command-and-control capabilities
at their disposal. They received instruction in the use of the netted command-
and-control system, but one cannot expect that to offset twenty-plus years of
experience in traditional modes. Second, the netted command and control
provided in Global 2000 may have been poorly designed. Third, the predicted
advantages of netted command and control may be overoptimistic, however ef-
fective a system and proficient its users. Global 2001 will focus on sorting out
these factors.)
In addition to command-and-control issues, Global 2000 exposed tensions
between the desires of theater war fighters to exploit information superiority
rapidly and decisively, and those of the national command authorities and their
coalition partners to proceed more cautiously. Further research will have to focus
on when and how information superiority can and should be converted to oper-
ational advantage in politically complex environments. It seems likely that po-
tential benefits of information superiority may not be exploitable under certain
circumstances. In any case, how can such advantages be measured?
Finally, though it is not an issue directly related to the use of information, the
concept of the high-speed logistics ship deserves further examination. It is un-
usual for the very existence of a single platform to have such a tangible impact on
so large an exercise; this fact alone justifies more detailed study.
N O T E S
1. The Navy Warfare Development Command
in Newport—which prepared the document
adopted as the Global 2000 conceptual
framework—uses the term “network-centric
operations” to subsume the more familiar
“network-centric warfare” as well as settings
other than warfighting. For both concepts,
see George Kasten [Capt., USN], “Building a
Beehive: Observations on the Transition to
Network-centric Operations,” Naval War
College Review, Autumn 2000, pp. 127–40;
Edward A. Smith, Jr., “Network-centric War-
fare: What’s the Point?” Naval War College
W A T M A N 8 7
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Review, Winter 2001, pp. 59–75; and the ref-
erences of both these articles.
2. Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game:
The First Five Years, Newport Paper 4 (New-
port, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. vii.
3. Ibid. Global War Game, by two figures prom-
inent in the history of the series, examines the
purposes, courses, outcomes, and lessons of its
earliest games. Throughout the Cold War the
series was known as the “Global War Game.”
4. This is a good example of the liberties that
were taken with political realism in order to
test the full range of phenomena associated
with network-centric operations.
5. Note again the political unreality. The point
is not whether BLUE would or would not ac-
tually “go first” but rather the nature of the
incentives to exploit information superiority
that may be created by network-centric
operations.
6. There is some question as to whether this
transfer of material could in actuality have
been effected so quickly and easily.
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